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CONGRESS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, 




The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr unleashed the 
Reapportionment Revolution, which was largely driven by litigation 
in the lower federal courts, with periodic additional guidance by the 
Court. That litigation continues to the present day, revived every 
decade by new census data and further complicated by the demands 
of the Voting Rights Act and other factors. Less appreciated has been 
the role of Congress and the president in influencing that litigation. 
Baker was initially quite controversial in some circles, and that 
hostility was manifested by bills introduced in Congress that would 
have restricted the impact of the case. But the bills did not pass, the 
opposition soon receded, and Baker came to be supported by most 
policymakers and the public. In 1976 Congress abolished the much 
criticized three-judge district court, but demonstrated its support for 
Baker by expressly leaving it intact as a forum for the litigation of 
reapportionment cases. The reasons for that decision are not clear, 
but one appears to be to reduce the pressures on one judge in such 
politically charged cases by making three judges responsible. 
Likewise, the president, through amicus curiae briefs filed by 
Solicitor General Archibald Cox, supported the result in Baker and 
influenced the doctrinal development of subsequent reapportionment 
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Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. An earlier version of this 
Article was presented at the Symposium on Baker v. Carr After 50 Years: Appraising the 
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cases. Those briefs also appear to have provided political support for 
federal court intrusion on apportionment matters previously left to 
state politics. This article addresses the consequences of these actions 
by Congress and the president on federal court reapportionment 
cases since Baker and situates that interbranch interaction in the 
academic literature focusing on the institutional context and 
aftermath of Supreme Court decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Baker v. Carr1 held that federal courts could hear suits challenging 
the legality of malapportioned state legislatures under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, the decision 
is firmly in the lauded canon of landmark Supreme Court decisions, 
and the “one person, one vote” principle it inaugurated for the 
apportionment of legislative bodies is now so well accepted that 
contemporary writers find it “hard to imagine what all the 
constitutional fuss was about.”2 The standard version of the reception 
of Baker is that it was almost immediately popular among elites and 
the general public, in sharp contrast to other important decisions of 
the Warren Court. The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims3 and other 
cases fleshed out the “one person, one vote” standard, and it was 
implemented quickly by litigation in the lower federal courts and state 
courts in over half the states.4 Opposition in Congress and elsewhere, 
such as it was, soon melted away, and Baker was well accepted by 
virtually everyone in only a few years.5 In subsequent decades the 
Supreme Court, and lower courts, struggled with whether and how to 
apply Baker and its progeny to more complicated and contentious 
issues like politically or racially gerrymandered districts, so litigation 
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 297 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
3 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4 See Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 320–22 (discussing how eager states 
were for reapportionment, as proven by thirty-four of them beginning litigation against state 
legislature apportionment schemes within nine months of the Baker ruling).
5 For the accepted story on the aftermath of Baker, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN,
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 268–70 (2009) (noting that an angry Congress 
shoved aside all other business to deal with the Court’s ruling in Baker); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 126–27 (2006) (discussing 
the predictability of Congress’ reaction following the Baker and Reynolds decisions, which was 
an attempt by the House of Representatives to overturn it by constitutional amendment); Tara 
Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 901–
02 n.177 (2011) (stating that in 1964 William Tuck, a Virginia Democrat introduced a measure 
in the House of Representatives to “eliminate federal jurisdiction over reapportionment cases,” 
but the Senate rejected the measure).
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under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) began to dominate 
reapportionment cases.6 But the core principle of “one person, one 
vote,” having its genesis in Baker, appears unscathed.
This version of the aftermath of Baker is accurate as far as it goes, 
but the premise of this Article is that the story is a richer and more 
complicated one. In particular, my goal is to unpack the notion that 
the reapportionment decisions were relatively uncontroversial at the 
time and later. The full story of the reaction to Baker is beyond the 
scope of the present Article,7 but I will focus on how the other 
branches of the federal government interacted with the Court at the 
time of the decision and reacted to Baker in the 1960s, 1970s, and 
later. The congressional and presidential reaction to Baker will place 
Baker in a broader context, and explain how those branches affect 
reapportionment litigation to the present day. 
Before addressing how the other branches confronted Baker and 
subsequent cases, Part II of the Article considers how the apparent 
emerging scholarly consensus that the Supreme Court, more often 
than not, is a majoritarian institution, pertains to the reapportionment 
cases. Is Baker rightly understood as an example of the majoritarian 
thesis? To what extent did Baker, then and now, reflect and garner 
support among interested publics? Part II turns to the Executive 
Branch’s interaction with Baker and subsequent cases and begins with 
Solicitor General (“SG”) Cox’s amicus curiae brief filed in the case, 
which supported the result reached by the majority. The consensus is 
that the brief played a role, and perhaps a crucial one, in the result 
reached and the eventual widespread support for reapportionment.8
Part II also addresses how the SG filed amicus briefs in subsequent 
reapportionment and other election law cases and the apparent 
influence of those filings on the Court. 
Part III addresses Congress’s reaction to Baker. Congress’s initial 
reaction was hostile as Congress introduced bills to overturn or limit 
the impact of the decision.9 This hostility, however, faded away 
quickly, and subsequent congressional actions can be seen as 
6 See ANTHONY A. PEACOCK, DECONSTRUCTING THE REPUBLIC: VOTING RIGHTS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE FOUNDERS’ REPUBLICANISM RECONSIDERED 41–42 (2008)
(discussing how Baker v. Carr and the reapportionment cases, together with the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 and litigation thereunder, opened contentious and ongoing debates over the 
structures and functions of many aspects of the American electoral system).
7 For useful histories of Baker and the reaction to it, see generally STEPHEN 
ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008); Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra
note 2; RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES (1970); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968).
8 See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
9 ROSEN, supra note 5, at 126–27.
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supportive of the decision.10 Baker and other reapportionment cases 
were initiated in three-judge district courts, with direct appeals to the 
Supreme Court.11 Likewise, the VRA required some states with a 
history of discriminatory election laws, mostly in the South, to clear 
changes to those laws with the Attorney General or a three-judge 
district court in the District of Columbia, with direct appeals to the 
Court. That provision remains intact.12 Congress repealed the three-
judge district court for other cases in 1976, but expressly left it intact 
for reapportionment cases. Part III considers how the congressional 
adoption of that specialized forum for the adjudication of these cases 
can be seen, in part, as special solicitude for, and even protection of,
the federal judges adjudicating these cases. Part IV concludes the 
Article.
I. BAKER V. CARR AND THE MAJORITARIAN THESIS
Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School famously argued that 
judicial review of the actions of federal and state governments should 
be limited since it was, as he saw it, counter-majoritarian in nature.13
Whether in fact Supreme Court decisions, and decisions of lower 
courts, are on the whole properly characterized that way has been the 
subject of extended academic debate. For example, Barry Friedman 
has recently argued that most Supreme Court decisions over time are 
properly regarded as being majoritarian and generally reflecting the 
wishes of and being supported by the American public.14 To consider 
how the debaters treat Baker v. Carr is instructive.
Friedman begins by briefly summarizing the doctrinal 
developments before and after Baker.15 Sixteen years prior to Baker,
the Court had held, in a plurality opinion by Justice Felix 
Frankfurther, in the factually similar case of Colegrove v. Green,16
that the dangers of courts entering a “political thicket” precluded 
judicial review of legislative malapportionment.17 Baker, in a majority
opinion by Justice William Brennan, distinguished Colegrove,
holding that such suits did not involve nonjusticiable political 
questions, since judicially manageable standards could be fashioned 
10 See infra notes 116–137 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
12 See sources cited infra note 145.
13 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
14 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5.
15 Id. at 267–68.
16 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
17 Id. at 556. Colegrove was a challenge based on the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST., art. 
IV, § 4, but the Court held the challenge to be nonjusticiable. 328 U.S. at 556.
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under the Equal Protection Clause.18 Justice Frankfurter (joined by 
Justice John M. Harlan) dissented vigorously and at length. 
Frankfurter argued, among other things, that holding such cases to be 
justiciable was a sharp break from precedent (i.e., Colegrove) and 
historical practice and would involve federal courts in “political 
entanglements” better left for resolution to the elected branches of 
government.19 Frankfurter predicted that such entanglements would 
lessen public confidence in the Court and that state legislatures would 
resist implementation.20 Cases following Baker established and 
applied the one-person, one-vote principle, requiring the redrawing of 
many districts for state legislatures and districts of the U.S. House of 
Representatives within states.21
Friedman observes that many federal and state legislators had been 
elected in districts that clearly violated the one-person, one-vote
principle, so opposition from those incumbents was predictable. Bills 
were introduced in Congress to limit Baker, while a coalition of the 
states, representing state governments, also proposed constitutional 
amendments to limit the impact of the decision. Some academics, 
such as Bickel, also criticized the decision and predicted that 
compliance would be lengthy and difficult.22 But the opposition soon 
faded and the critics were proven wrong. Compliance “was 
remarkably quick,” since litigation in lower federal and state courts 
was soon initiated and orders requiring the redrawing of districts 
promptly followed.23 Friedman concludes that the “public loved these 
decisions. . . . Academics could whine about the decisions, and 
legislators could grumble as they were reapportioned out of a job, but 
the Supreme Court had read its public well: frustration over the issue 
had been building in the body politic for a long time.”24
It does not denigrate Friedman’s lively and insightful account of 
Baker and its aftermath to question whether the case fits so neatly into 
the majoritarian model. Critics of that model have raised a number of 
concerns about the theory and application of the model as a whole 
and to particular cases. For example, when a court decision is said to 
18 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
19 Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 267–68.
21 For a full doctrinal discussion of Colegrove, Baker, and Baker’s progeny, see MICHAEL 
DIMINO, BRADLEY SMITH & MICHAEL SOLIMINE, VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 107–
224 (2010).
22 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 268–69.
23 Id. at 269.
24 Id. Friedman also points out that the dysfunctions of gerrymandering had been reported 
in the popular press in the period up to Baker and that the Kennedy administration had 
supported the plaintiffs in Baker when the SG filed an amicus brief. Id. at 270. 
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represent or reflect the majority view, does that mean a pre-existing 
majority, a later one, or one formed or informed by the decision 
itself?25 Likewise, is evidence of a majority taken from public opinion 
polls, other national political institutions (i.e., Congress or the 
president), state and local governments, interest groups, or some 
combination of the above?26 The majoritarian model also does not 
often make clear how life-tenured federal judges are affected or 
influenced by pressure from these majorities.27
Consider how some of these concerns can be applied to the story 
of Baker v. Carr. The reapportionment decisions with their popular 
support are often contrasted to other, far more controversial decisions 
of the Warren Court.28 But Baker also shared characteristics with its 
counter-majoritarian cousins. While Baker dealt with a legislature in 
Tennessee that had not reapportioned in over fifty years, leading to 
differences in the population of urban and rural electoral districts, not 
all states were similarly passive. Indeed, it can be said that in many 
states “the electorate supported malapportionment.”29 Prior to 1962, 
in at least ten states, the public voted on initiatives that would have 
reapportioned legislatures to reflect changes in population, and all but 
one failed.30 Whether or not due to the results of an initiative, in 1962 
virtually all state legislatures were malapportioned and violated the 
upcoming one-person, one-vote standard.31 To be sure, it cannot be 
said that many in the general public, directly or through their elected 
representatives, supported overtly malapportioned legislative bodies. 
Indeed, it is often observed that prior to Baker, the self-interest of 
25 Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 116. Pildes argues that the “lack of a precise definition of the relevant majority
enables majoritarians to claim that almost any decision of the Court reflects majoritarian views, 
since there is almost always some ‘majority’ to which one can appeal in asserting that the 
Court’s decisions reflect ‘majority’ views.” Id.
26 Id. at 119.
27 Id. at 126–39; Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the 
Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010).
28 E.g., CORTNER, supra note 7, at 256–65 (contrasting implementation of 
reapportionment and school desegregation decisions); FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 267 
(contrasting decisions striking down mandatory public school prayer with reapportionment 
decisions); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections
on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1122 n.98 (2002)
(contrasting the public support for Baker with the controversy surrounding Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
29 Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 305. 
30 Id. One study of these initiatives attributes their defeat not to “competing normative 
theories of representation but, rather, simple political self-interest.” Jonathan Woon, Direct 
Democracy and the Selection of Representative Institutions: Voter Support for Apportionment 
Initiatives, 1924–62, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 167, 183 (2007). That is, voting was largely 
determined on whether particular counties would gain or lose seats in the legislature under the 
redistricting called for by the initiative. Id.
31 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 3.
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incumbent state legislators led to their passivity in not redrawing 
electoral lines without the mandate of a court. But it can be said 
Baker shattered the status quo on apportionment, which suggests that 
it did not simply codify the views of the majority of the American 
public.32
The upheaval of Baker is also reflected in the views of then
prominent academic critics. The aforementioned Alexander Bickel 
was foremost among those critics. Not long after Baker was decided, 
Bickel lamented that the decision would lead to a one-size-fits-all 
solution for the apportionment of legislative districts. In a “diverse, 
federated country,” he argued, states should be free to decide to draw 
districts that reflect not only equality of individual votes, but other 
values he considered rational, such as maintaining representation of 
political parties or particular geographic areas.33 Bickel was not alone 
in criticizing Baker on the basis that it would lead to endless litigation 
and (as Frankfurter argued) would improperly involve federal courts 
in the purportedly highly political enterprise of drawing district 
lines.34 More recent and even sympathetic academics do not 
necessarily absolve Baker of all sins. Leading scholars have 
persuasively argued that Baker and the subsequent one-person, one-
vote rule are difficult to defend as proper constitutional interpretation 
on textual or originalist grounds. When the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, it was difficult to argue that the drafters, ratifiers, or 
general public thought that the Equal Protection Clause would outlaw 
the then malapportioned legislatures.35 And the text of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments can be understood to forbid official 
discrimination against the voting rights of African Americans, but 
leave intact other inequality in the allocation of voting rights.36 Some 
years later, Baker and the one-person, one-vote principle were
32 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 
262 (2009) (“The Court’s entry into the political thicket was awesome. . . .”).
33 Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 40, 42–
43 (1962).
34 See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 167–68 (summarizing views of 
academic critics of Baker); FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 269 (summarizing views of academic 
critics of Baker).
35 ROSEN, supra note 5, at 125–26; David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1260.
36 ROSEN, supra note 5, at 126; Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Looking for a Few Good 
Philosopher Kings: Political Gerrymandering as a Question of Institutional Competence, 43 
CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1171–72 (2011); Strauss, supra note 35, at 1260–61 & n.58. These writers 
typically rely on Justice Harlan’s opinions in some of the reapportionment cases, e.g., Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–91 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting), while acknowledging that some 
scholars have taken issue with Harlan’s views, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth 
Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV., at 33, 85. 
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embraced by most of the legal academy when they were defended by 
John Hart Ely as an example of his influential representation-
reinforcing normative defense of constitutional review. He argued 
that the Court is right to step in and strike down laws that limit public 
participation in the political process.37 The reapportionment decisions 
under this theory are best seen as judicial intervention to make an 
arguably nonmajoritarian political system more majoritarian.38
My point here is not to deny that Baker came to be approved by 
almost all of the public (however we measure that term) or by most of
the interested elites.39 Fifty years later, Baker and the one-person, 
37 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74
(1980).
38 Id. at 120–24. For further discussion of Ely’s influence on the academic view of the 
reapportionment decisions, see Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of 
Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 288–89 (2010); Pamela S. Karlan, 
John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 
1333–34 (2005); compare STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 44–45 (2008) (arguing that a cadre of 
younger liberal law professors in the 1960s and 1970s, like Ely, mobilized to defend in 
scholarship the egalitarian decisions of the Warren Court, including Baker v. Carr). It is difficult 
but not impossible to find modern scholars skeptical, at least to some degree, of the 
reapportionment cases. See, e.g., PEACOCK, supra note 6, at 3–5 (summarizing wide-ranging 
criticism of reapportionment and VRA cases on the basis that, among other things, the right to 
an equal vote found in the former cases is in tension with the right to equal and effective 
representation found in the latter cases); ROSEN, supra note 5, at 127–29 (discussing how the 
one-person, one-vote principle “opened up a series of unanswered questions,” including the 
permissible amount of deviation from that principle and did not eliminate and even facilitated 
political gerrymandering); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes 
and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 106 (2000) (arguing that 
reapportionment cases are better grounded in the Guarantee Clause, rather than the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
39 Most, but not all. It is worth noting that some influential conservative legal voices 
remained critical of the reapportionment decisions many years later. For one example, Robert 
Bork in 1990 criticized the cases for their “egalitarianism and . . . disregard for the 
Constitution.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 84 (1990). While the one-person, one-vote principle, stated in the abstract, “sounds 
admirable,” in his view, it was not admirable to force it “upon people who have chosen 
democratically to arrange their state governments in part upon a different principle.” Id. Bork 
continues that he is not opposed as such to the one-person, one-vote principle, but argues, 
echoing the dissents in Baker, Reynolds, and other cases, that the Equal Protection Clause was 
not a principled basis to judicially superintend the drawing of district lines by state legislatures, 
and that is was not irrational or unconstitutional for states to “want to provide representation for 
people in certain localities, perhaps because they had distinctive economic interests or social 
views that might be overlooked in a purely majoritarian legislature.” Id. at 86–87. Another 
example would be Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. While applying for a position 
with the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel during the Reagan Administration, 
Alito submitted a letter in which he discussed his interest in legal issues and volunteered his 
opposition to some Warren Court decisions, including the reapportionment cases. This criticism 
came up frequently in his confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 687 
(2006) (“It is difficult to imagine in this day and age any serious objection to the rights 
identified in [Baker and subsequent reapportionment] cases.”) (statement of Samuel Issacharoff,
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one-vote principle seem to be well accepted by the general public, 
even if their knowledge of redistricting in general is not deeply
informed.40 Rather, I am suggesting that the usual assertions that the 
reapportionment decisions were quickly accepted are basically true, 
but understate the counter-majoritarian (in all senses of that term) 
nature of the decision, and some of the initial opposition to the 
decisions. In other words, the decision was not inevitable and, like 
any controversial decision, was contingent on any number of factors. 
For that reason, it is useful to reexamine how the other branches of 
the federal government were involved in the adjudication of, and 
reacted to, the reapportionment cases. Executive involvement and
congressional opposition (and then a lack thereof) played a significant 
role in shaping and implementing the law of reapportionment 
declared by the Court. The next parts of this Article address the role 
of the other branches in the reapportionment revolution.
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL SAFEGUARDS OF BAKER V. CARR
Throughout American history, the executive branch has sought to 
influence the composition and decision making of the Supreme Court, 
and the lower federal courts, in myriad ways.41 Regarding the 
Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University). In his testimony, Alito stated, 
notwithstanding his earlier views (informed in part by his reading Bickel’s work in college, id.
at 519–20), that he fully accepted the reapportionment cases, id. at 380, and explained his 
previous criticism as based not so much on the principle of one-person, one-vote, but rather on 
its arguably overly strict application in cases like Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), 
which struck down a districting plan in New Jersey, Alito’s home state. Id. at 381–84, 501–02. 
See also PEACOCK, supra note 6, at 1 (arguing that “no serious discussion of the 
reapportionment cases took place during the confirmation hearings [on Alito’s Supreme Court 
nomination]”). A final example might be Justice Clarence Thomas, whose concurring opinion in 
the VRA case of Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891–946 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., 
concurring), argued that section 2 of the VRA should not be construed to cover vote dilution 
claims. In the course of that opinion, he favorably referred to Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in 
Baker v. Carr, id. at 896–97, indirectly suggesting that he (and perhaps Justice Scalia, who 
joined the opinion) might be willing to revisit the correctness of that case and of the one-person, 
one-vote principle. See Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 109, 120 n.82 (1994) (making this point).
40 See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 133, 151 (1980)
(discussing public opinions polls from the 1960s on the reapportionment cases); CORTNER,
supra note 7, at 237 n.57 (same). For more recent polls indicating support for the one-person, 
one-vote principle, see Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, 
Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting, 9 ELECTION L.J. 325, 325 & n.2 (2010). 
41 See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN 
U.S. HISTORY (2007) (focusing on the relationship between the executive and judicial 
branches); Mark C. Miller, The Interactions Between the Federal Courts and the Other 
Branches, in EXPLORING JUDICIAL POLITICS 274 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2009) (exploring the 
interactions between the courts and the two other branches of government); Jeb Barnes, 
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Supreme Court, the most obvious method is presidential
appointments. Another way to influence decision making, 
increasingly used in the past half-century, is through amicus curiae 
briefs filed by the SG in Supreme Court cases where the United States 
is not a party. In the 1950s, the Supreme Court modified its rules to 
make the filing of amicus briefs easier, and the SG (unlike other 
parties) is permitted to file such a brief without the permission of the 
Court or of the parties to a particular case, at both the certiorari and 
merits stages of a case.42 Since then, the SG has taken the opportunity 
to file many such briefs, especially (though not only) in high-profile 
cases. The professionalism of the SG and the perceived high quality 
of the SG’s amicus briefs have apparently come to be seen by the 
Court itself as a useful and objective source of information for the 
Court, so much so that the SG is sometimes referred to as the Tenth 
Justice.43 Similarly, the SG and the Administration he or she 
represents have not been shy about advocating, via amicus briefs, the 
policy objectives of that particular administration.44
Thus, the SG’s amicus activity has both an objective and an 
advocatory component, though how that plays out in the decision to 
file an amicus brief, and the position advocated in that brief, has 
depended on the sometimes different and shifting policy goals of 
Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on the Role of Courts in American 
Politics and Policy Making, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 25 (2007) (reviewing studies that explore 
the interaction of the branches of government).
42 EUGENE GRESSMAN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 512–17, 734–35 (9th ed. 
2007); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 761–67 (2000). The relative ease of filing amicus briefs 
in the Supreme Court, and the justices’ frequent reliance on those briefs, has not been without 
controversy. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record 
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–37 (2011) (discussing whether judicial reliance on amicus 
briefs is consistent with the adversarial system).
43 LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF 
LAW (1987). The “Tenth Justice” analogy has been a matter of dispute, on both descriptive and 
normative grounds. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development 
of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 62 (1998); Adam D. Chandler, 
Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or a Zealous Advocate?,
121 YALE L.J. 725 (2011).
44 See Barbara L. Graham, Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The 
Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953–2002, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 253 (2003) (empirical study 
of SG’s amicus briefs filed in civil rights cases in the Supreme Court); Stephen S. Meinhold & 
Steven A. Shull, Policy Congruence Between the President and the Solicitor General, 51 POL.
RES. Q. 527 (1998) (discussing ways of measuring how SG advances the president’s policy 
agenda); Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 
IND. L.J. 1297, 1306–15 (2000) (discussing SG’s amicus briefs filed in important civil rights 
cases in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations); James L. Copper, Note, The 
Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675 (1990) (empirical study of 
SG’s amicus filings in different historical periods).
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particular presidents and SGs.45 The Court, no matter its ideological 
composition or that of the executive, appears to place significant 
weight on the views of the SG. The Court sometimes requests the 
views of the SG, via amicus brief, on whether the Court should grant 
review in a case where the United States is not a party.46 Overall, the 
SG has participated as amicus on the merits in up to thirty or more 
cases in recent Terms, no small matter given the shrunken docket of 
the Court since the early 1990s.47 The SG’s amicus briefs seemingly
have been especially influential on the Court as a whole and on 
individual justices, as reflected in the high rate of agreement between 
the Court’s decisions and the SG’s positions and the frequent citation 
of such briefs in the Court’s opinions.48 The success of the SG as 
amicus has been variously attributed to the expertise and experience 
of the SG’s office, the ideological confluence of the respective policy 
positions of the SG and of the Court in a particular case, and the 
strategic behavior of the justices, seeking political cover regarding the 
anticipated reaction to a decision by another branch of government.49
45 See Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., Amicus Curiae or Amicus Praesidentis? Reexamining the 
Role of the Solicitor General in Filing Amici, 89 JUDICATURE 317, 321–322 (2006) (positing 
that amicus activity “var[ies] across a number of dimensions” and that while “[s]ome cases will 
likely reflect direct presidential influence,” other “cases will inspire presidential indifference” 
and accordingly reflect more closely the positions of the SG). See generally RICHARD L.
PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE STRUCTURING 
OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION 11 (2003) (engaging in a study of 
the manner in which the solicitor general balances law and politics); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 1 (1992) (recounting the manner in which “the 
work of the nation's lawyer . . . serve[s] as an integral component of executive policy making”).
46 Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the 
Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35 (2010); David C. Thompson & Melanie 
F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call 
for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237,
242 (2009).
47 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s 
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1353–60 (2010) (discussing
the SG’s amicus activity in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). For a general overview of the 
Court’s shrunken docket in recent decades, see Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining 
the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).
48 See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. Q. 765 (2011) (empirical study of the influence of SG 
amicus brief at the certiorari stage); Rebecca E. Deen et al., The Solicitor General as Amicus
1953–2000: How Influential?, 87 JUDICATURE 60 (2003) (documenting success rates of SG’s 
amicus briefs in merits cases); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 760 (stating that the Court 
cited SG amicus brief in 40 percent of cases in which such a brief was filed, the highest citation 
rate of amicus briefs filed by frequent institutional litigants).
49 See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 104–06, 180–82 (2008)
(addressing ideological confluence, institutional deference, and professional expertise as 
explanations for success of the SG as amicus in the Supreme Court); Michael A. Bailey et al., 
Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72 (2005) (same); Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why 
the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1566–68
(2010) (arguing that the Court is usually only concerned with elite opinion, and often obtains 
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A. The Solicitor General as Amicus in the Early Reapportionment 
Cases
How the SG has participated in the reapportionment cases provides 
a useful case study of the advocacy of the Executive branch and its 
effect upon the Judicial branch. The SG in the Truman administration 
got off to a slow start by not participating in Colegrove v. Green,
which had challenged the apportionment of congressional districts in 
Illinois.50 But the Eisenhower administration, which had notably filed 
an amicus brief supporting desegregation in Brown v. Board of 
Education,51 showed more interest in election law cases, which
culminated in Baker. The SG filed an amicus brief in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot52 supporting a challenge to a gerrymander of the boundaries 
of the city of Tuskegee in Alabama. The Supreme Court unanimously 
held the gerrymander to be unconstitutional because it was meant to 
restrict the rights of African American voters.53
At the same time Gomillion was being argued and decided, the SG 
in the outgoing Eisenhower administration and officials in the 
incoming Kennedy Administration were closely following the Baker
litigation in the lower courts.54 Indeed, the plaintiffs in Baker lobbied 
officials in the Eisenhower administration to intervene on their side as 
an amicus in the case, in part due to the purported political advantages 
to Republicans that might accrue in the case.55 The Kennedy 
administration showed an even greater interest in the case, due in part 
to the personal interest of the new president, and of his brother 
such opinion through amicus briefs); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic 
Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
(discussing strategic model); Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends From the Crowd: Amicus 
Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 197–202 (2009) (arguing that 
amicus participation increases the legitimacy of the Court by providing affected groups the 
ability to apparently participate in the decision-making process).
50 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946). Late in the Truman administration the SG filed an amicus 
brief in a case challenging the Georgia county unit system of apportionment, but that 
unsuccessful challenge culminated in a per curiam dismissal by the Supreme Court. Cox v. 
Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (per curiam); see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 76–77 (discussing 
Solicitor General Philip Perlman’s intervention as amicus curiae in Cox v. Peters). The Georgia 
system was later struck down in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
51 347 U.S. 483, 485 (1954). For a discussion of the SG’s amicus brief in Brown, see 
Waxman, supra note 44, at 1307–08.
52 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
53 Id. at 347–348. For a discussion of Gomillion and the SG’s brief, see CORTNER, supra
note 7, at 84–86. The Gomillion Court did not cite the SG’s brief.
54 Id. at 89.
55 Id. at 77–78. The argument was made that the case presented an opportunity for the 
administration to “identify itself with the popular rights of people,” and that urban voters 
represented by the plaintiffs might appreciate the help of Republicans. Id. at 77.
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Robert, the attorney general.56 The new administration concluded, not 
surprisingly, that the many malapportioned state legislatures worked 
mainly to the benefit of GOP-leaning rural voters, so victory for 
plaintiffs in Baker would inure to the benefit of Democratic-leaning 
urban voters.57
Eventually the Kennedy administration filed amicus briefs 
recommending that the Court note probable jurisdiction of the direct 
appeal by the plaintiffs from the adverse decision of the three-judge 
district court and supporting the plaintiffs on the merits.58 Despite the 
interest of his superiors, the new Solicitor General, Archibald Cox of 
Harvard Law School, was reluctant to file an amicus brief that backed 
the plaintiffs in sweeping terms.59 His doubts were due, in part, to 
having been mentored by then-Professor Frankfurter at Harvard and 
also due to Cox’s genuine uncertainty about recommending that 
federal courts intervene in reapportionment cases.60 Eventually he 
filed a brief that narrowly argued that federal courts had jurisdiction 
to hear reapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause 
(thus distinguishing Colegrove) and avoided addressing how federal 
courts should order reapportionment.61
The majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, ruled
for the plaintiffs on the relatively narrow ground that federal courts 
had jurisdiction over such claims, which were not barred by the 
political question doctrine.62 Justices Clark, Douglas, and Stewart 
filed opinions concurring with the majority, while Justices Frankfurter 
and Harlan dissented.63 The majority opinion thus mirrored many of 
56 Id. at 84.
57 See id. (observing that Senator John F. Kennedy had written an article in the New York 
Times Magazine in 1958 critical of malapportionment); ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 
7, at 4–6, 128–29 (discussing lobbying of the new administration on this issue); CORTNER,
supra note 7, at 89–91 (same); Bruce J. Terris, Attorney General Kennedy Versus Solicitor 
General Cox: The Formulation of the Federal Government’s Position in the Reapportionment 
Cases, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 335, 337 (2007) (discussing presumed political interests of the 
Administration).
58 Terris, supra note 57, at 337.
59 Id.
60 See id. (stating that Cox had “deep-seated doubt” about using the courts to solve the 
malapportionment issue); ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 133 (stating that 
Frankfurter was a mentor to Cox).
61 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 133–39 (discussing brief and oral 
argument by Cox in Baker); CORTNER, supra note 7, at 103–16 (same). One contemporary 
observer noted that after the second oral argument in Baker, Cox, after enduring sharp 
questioning from Frankfurter in the oral argument, whispered that “Felix Frankfurter is right.” 
Terris, supra note 57, at 337.
62 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1961).
63 Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 265 
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).
96
1122 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4
the arguments pressed by Cox. There was, and is, widespread belief 
that the justices in the majority were heavily influenced by the SG,64
and indeed subsequent accounts of the internal deliberations of the 
justices in Baker seem to confirm that influence.65 That said, there is 
no explicit reference to the SG’s amicus brief in any of the opinions. 
A citation to or discussion of the SG’s amicus briefs in Court 
opinions is a reasonable proxy for measuring the influence of such a 
brief, but it should be used with caution. The justices might be 
influenced by the brief and not mention it in an opinion, and similarly
a stray citation of the brief in the opinion might be the work of an 
overzealous law clerk and not demonstrate any particular influence. 
The Court might reach a particular result anyway, whether or not 
advocated by the SG, or anyone else.66
However much the SG’s brief in Baker was influential, the 
Kennedy administration continued to pay close attention to the 
subsequent reapportionment cases. President Kennedy publicly 
praised the decision,67 and his brother the attorney general took the 
rare step of arguing for the United States as amicus in the next 
important case, Gray v. Sanders, which involved a challenge to the 
Georgia county-unit system for Democratic primaries in which
certain counties were given certain designated votes, which
discriminated against the more populous counties. 68 The Court struck 
down the system, for the first time explicitly employing the “one 
64 See, e.g., ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 144–45, 151 (arguing that SG’s 
arguments influenced the discussions of the justices after the second oral argument and the 
drafting of the majority opinion); DIXON, supra note 7, at 177 (noting that the SG’s amicus 
briefs and participation in oral arguments in the reapportionment cases “tended to shape the 
Court’s perception of the issues and indeed to dominate the litigation at certain stages”); Terris, 
supra note 57, at 341 (noting that the Department of Justice assumed that the amicus brief had 
“greatly influenced” the decision); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: 
Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 588–89 (2005) (discussing how the Kennedy administration 
encouraged the Court to intervene in legislative apportionment, to overcome entrenched 
interests which favored malapportioned legislatures).
65 See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS 
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 844–51 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (several 
justices referred to the SG’s position in conference discussions on Baker); BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT 413–14 (1983) (same). 
But see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 184–91 
(2010) (extensively discussing Brennan’s drafting of the Baker opinion with no mention of the 
SG’s amicus brief).
66 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 767–87 (discussing citations to, adoptions of 
arguments in, and other measures of influence of amicus briefs on the Court).
67 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 146–47; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 204 (2000).
68 372 U.S. 368, 370 (1963).
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person, one vote” rationale.69 This time only Justice Harlan in dissent 
briefly mentioned the SG’s amicus brief.70
Despite the success of the SG’s amicus filings in Baker and Gray,
Cox remained ambivalent about aggressively pushing the one-person, 
one-vote rationale with its attendant consequence of federal courts 
inevitably striking down the districting of many state legislatures. His 
ambivalence did not prove noteworthy in Wesberry v. Sanders,71
where the Court struck down the malapportioned districts in Georgia 
for the U.S. House of Representatives, on the ground that the power 
delegated to states in Article I, section 2 of the Constitution required 
that states draw such districts to comply with the one-person, one-
vote principle. The SG filed an amicus brief simply calling for a 
remand for a resolution on the merits, the lower court having 
dismissed the case on political question grounds, and there was no 
mention of the brief in the Court’s opinion.72
In 1964, the Court finally directly confronted a challenge to state 
legislative districts in Reynolds v. Sims73 and five companion cases,74
and there the Court required that those districts comply with the one-
person, one-vote principle. The SG filed an amicus brief that applied 
to all six cases,75 but there was vigorous debate within the Department 
of Justice on the arguments to be made.76 Cox was reluctant to argue 
that application of a strict one-person, one-vote principle was 
constitutionally demanded.77 He was particularly troubled by the 
argument that both houses of a state legislature must conform to that 
principle (when both chambers of the federal legislature did not),78
and by the fact that in the case from Colorado, the voters had 
approved by referendum the malapportioned districts.79 After much 
discussion, Cox drafted the amicus brief, and while not arguing for 
strict application of the principle, the brief did argue that 
69 Id. at 381.
70 Id. at 383 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the SG’s amicus filing in Gray
and RFK’s argument, see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 192–93; Terris, supra note 57, at 338–39.
71 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
72 For discussion of the SG’s amicus opinion in Wesberry, see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 
226; Terris, supra note 57, at 339–40.
73 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
74 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. 
Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 
695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
75 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER supra note 7, at 171.
76 Helen J. Knowles, May It Please the Court? The Solicitor General’s Not-So-“Special” 
Relationship: Archibald Cox and the 1963–1964 Reapportionment Cases, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
279, 283 (2006).
77 Id. at 291.
78 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 170.
79 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 215.
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malapportionment that led to “gross inequalities” among voters, and 
which was based on irrational reasons should not be permitted.80 The 
Court majority found for the plaintiffs in all of the cases and did 
strictly apply the one-person, one-vote rationale.81 Given that the 
Court was essentially rejecting the milder position advanced by the 
SG, it is not surprising that the only reference to the SG’s amicus 
brief in the opinions is one in a dissenting opinion.82
The conventional wisdom is that the SG’s amicus briefs had a 
significant influence on the decision making of the justices in the 
reapportionment cases from 1960 to 1964. But the available evidence 
for this proposition is mixed. The Court followed the advice of the 
brief in some instances, but not in others. If influence there was, it 
was not much reflected in citations to or discussion of the briefs in the 
opinions, and it is not clear if the Court would have reached the same 
results even in the absence of briefing by the SG. On the other hand, a 
deeper investigation of the drafting of these opinions and their 
political context and aftermath might shed greater light on the 
influence of the SG’s brief. A full exploration of those factors is 
beyond the scope of the present article. However, Part IV of this 
Article will consider congressional reaction to the reapportionment 
cases, and the eventual muted reaction to the decisions by that body 
may have been due, in part, to the support generally given the 
decisions by the president and the SG.
B. The Solicitor General as Amicus in the Later Reapportionment and 
Other Election Law Cases
A fuller appreciation for the SG’s role as amicus in the Supreme 
Court can be gained by examining the filing of such briefs and the 
Court’s apparent use of the briefs, in the reapportionment, VRA, and 
other election law cases decided since 1964. Richard Hasen has 
compiled a list of such cases from 1901 to 2009,83 and I determined 
80 See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 172–74 (discussing the SG’s approach
in the consolidated cases). See also CORTNER, supra note 7, at 215–17 (same); Knowles, supra 
note 76, at 279 (discussing drafting of the SG’s amicus brief).
81 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
82 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 7–60 n.16 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
83 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 166–75 (2003) (listing cases from 1900 to 
2000); Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001–2010: A 
Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 332–33 (2011)
(listing cases from 2001 to 2010). I added a case decided in 2011, Arizona Free Enterprise Club 
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). In many of the cases listed by Hasen, the United States or a 
federal agency (e.g., the Federal Election Commission) was a party, so the SG was already 
representing a party and did not have the option to file an amicus brief. My examination was 
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which of those cases from 1960 to the present the SG had filed an 
amicus brief, whether the Court majority agreed with the position
taken by the SG, and whether one or more opinions in a particular 
case cited or discussed the SG’s amicus brief. The results are 
compiled in the Appendix to this Article.84
First, consider some overall trends found in that data. From 1960 
to 2011, the SG filed amicus briefs in fifty election law cases, out of 
189 cases in which the United States (or an agency thereof) was not a 
party.85 The Court agreed with the positions advanced in thirty-four of 
those briefs, an impressive record of congruence matched by that 
found in all of the cases in which the SG files an amicus brief.86 One 
or more opinions cited or discussed the SG’s amicus brief in twenty-
eight of the cases, an even higher rate than that found for the SG’s 
amicus briefs in all cases.87
The SG filed amicus briefs in several of the post–1964 
reapportionment cases that considered various issues on the 
application of the one-person, one-vote principle.88 Most of the cases 
were decided in the 1960s and 1970s, since the one-person, one-vote
principle came to be fairly settled by that point. In contrast, by the late 
1960s, cases under the VRA, and those brought under the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments with regard to the effect on redistricting 
on African Americans (and other minorities) came to occupy much of 
the Court’s agenda.89 The SG filed amicus briefs in a number of the 
limited to those cases in which the SG did not represent a party, and had discretion to participate 
as an amicus.
84 See infra p. 41. 
85 As the Appendix indicates, I counted one case when the Court rendered two or more 
decisions on similar issues on the same day (e.g., Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases), 
since the SG typically filed one amicus brief for all of those decisions, when a brief was filed at 
all. By examining each SG amicus brief, I also determined whether the Court had previously 
called for the views of the SG (i.e., CVSG). See supra note 46. Some studies of SG amicus 
activity exclude cases where there was a CVSG, since “such invitations are most appropriately 
viewed as mandatory filings and therefore not subject to the SG’s discretion.” Chris Nicholson 
& Paul M. Collins, Jr., The Solicitor General’s Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court,
36 AM. POL. RES. 382, 396 (2008) (citation omitted). Only 7 of the 50 cases in the present study 
were determined to have a CVSG, and that relatively small number did not justify excluding 
those cases. There have been fewer CVSGs in recent years. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 
47, at 1331–32, 1344. 
86 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
87 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 760 (Court cited SG amicus brief in 40 percent of 
cases in which such a brief was filed).
88 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (propriety 
of mid–decade reapportionment); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (deference federal 
courts should give to state courts in reapportionment litigation); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist.,
397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applicability of one-person, one-vote principle to local governmental unit);
Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (same).
89 See DIMINO, SMITH & SOLIMINE, supra note 21, at 225–26, 285–288 (describing 
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leading cases in that category,90 and in cases involving other election 
law issues.91
As noted above, the Court citing or discussing the SG’s amicus 
brief in the opinions is both an over- and under-inclusive proxy for 
the apparent influence of that brief.92 But it can be a useful starting 
point to measure influence. On that score, some leading cases do not 
refer to the SG’s amicus brief.93 Those that do cite the brief 
sometimes make only passing and seemingly inconsequential 
references,94 but in others the Court seems to have been particularly 
influenced by the brief, as measured by the frequency and depth of 
citation to and discussion of the brief.95
Whether the Court agrees with the SG’s position is another 
measure of influence. While the overall agreement rate seems 
impressive, there are notable exceptions where the Court departed 
increasing litigation under the VRA, and constitutional amendments, with regard to districting 
and race). 
90 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (obligation to create crossover 
districts under section 2 of the VRA); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008) (electoral changes 
subject to preclearance under section 5 of the VRA); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (racial 
gerrymandering); Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (applying section 5 of the 
VRA); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (minority–majority districts as court remedy); 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (application of 1982 amendments to section 2 of the 
VRA); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (challenge under Fifteenth Amendment to 
at–large electoral system); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (private right of 
action available to enforce VRA).
91 E.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (holding that a 
state’s public financing provision that equalized electoral funding in state campaigns was 
unconstitutional); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008)
(holding that the state’s voter identification law was constitutional); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395–96 (2000) (concluding that state limits on contributions to state 
campaigns was constitutional); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669
(1998) (holding that a state-owned broadcaster could constitutionally exclude a political
candidate from televised debates in a nonpublic forum); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 
(1997) (holding that a state requirement for drug testing of candidates did not fit with the types 
of searched permitted by the Constitution); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
783 (1995) (holding that state-passed term limits for members of Congress violated the 
Constitution); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that a state’s 
poll tax was unconstitutional).
92 See supra notes 60–64 accompanying text.
93 E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. 399; Thornton, 514 U.S. at 779;
Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) (VRA application to state judicial elections); Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55; Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
94 E.g., Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19 (referring briefly to the SG amicus brief); Branch v. Smith, 
538 U.S. 254, 266 (2003) (same); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 261 n.8, 268 n.22 (1982)
(same).
95 E.g., Lopez, 525 U.S. at 281 (finding it “especially relevant” that the SG’s amicus reads 
the section 5 preclearance requirement “as we do”); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 
186, 231–32 (1996) (“attach[ing] significance” to the SG’s amicus position that private litigants 
could enforce the VRA); Allen, 393 U.S. at 557 n.23 (finding it “significant” that the SG amicus
brief urges that private litigants should have standing to sue in order to enforce the VRA).
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from that position,96 sometimes with the Court expressly countering 
the SG’s amicus brief.97 The disagreement can of course be a function 
of the different jurisprudential positions of a majority of the Court and 
the SG at any given point. Those positions were compatible in Baker
and the other early reapportionment cases, but there was divergence 
in later voting rights cases as the composition of the Court changed 
and new presidents were elected.98
The SG did not participate as amicus in all of the reapportionment 
or other election law cases after 1964.99 No doubt, a confluence of 
political and practical considerations played roles in decisions 
whether the SG should file such briefs in any given case. These 
considerations include whether the Court requested the views of the 
when it was deciding whether to review a lower court decision, the 
general ideological positions of the president and of Congress, and the 
96 E.g., Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2824 (directly opposing SG’s amicus brief by holding that 
public financing for state elections is unconstitutional); Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 
U.S. 491, 493, 500 (1992) (affirming the District Court’s decision that the section five
preclearance was unnecessary when the SG amicus brief argued for reversal); Bolden, 446 U.S.
at 57, 65 (reversing the lower courts in holding that the at-large electoral systems were
constitutional, whereas the SG and amicus brief argued for affirmance of the lower court); 
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 507 n.24 (1977) (stating that, although the SG’s amicus 
suggests limited judicial review in certain circumstances, the Court concluded that Congress’s 
intent was to exclude all judicial review of Attorney General’s decision on preclearance under 
section five of VRA).
97 E.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (expressly rejecting the SG’s amicus 
suggestion of mootness); Presley, 502 U.S. at 501, 504–05 (also arguing and concluding against 
the SG’s amicus brief and reasoning); id. at 514 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
prior cases call for “considerable deference,” albeit not “acquiescence,” to the Attorney 
General’s, and impliedly the SG’s, views as amicus in VRA cases) (citing Perkins v. Matthews, 
400 U.S. 379, 390–91 (1971)); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7, 55, 61–62, 78 (1986)
(disagreeing with various positions taken by the SG in the amicus brief); Morris, 432 U.S. at 
507 n.24 (also rejecting the SG’s suggestion. Compare Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 421
(2008) (majority opinion stating that the SG’s amicus brief provides a concession and viewing 
the brief with criticism), with id. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (favorably citing the same 
amicus brief). Compare Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2824 (discussing “flaws” in the arguments made 
by the SG’s amicus brief), with id. at 2842 n.11 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (favorably citing the 
same amicus brief).
98 For one prominent example, consider in the Reagan Administration, the SG as amicus 
(in a brief filed at the invitation of the Court) argued for a narrow interpretation of the 1982 
amendments to the VRA. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN 
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 104–05 (1991) (SG Fried describing his negative 
reaction to a broader effects test instead of a narrow construction of the VRA); PACELLE, supra
note 45, at 164 (describing SG Fried’s attack on precedence and focusing on a narrow view of 
the 1982 amendments to the VRA). A majority of the Court rejected the SG’s position in 
Thornburg. See 478 U.S. at 43 n.7, 55, 61–62, 78 (expressly opposing the SG’s arguments). The 
SG in the Clinton Administration, in contrast, took a more liberal position as amicus in some 
election law cases. See PACELLE, supra note 45, at 182–92 (discussing SG’s amicus filings in 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 876 (1994), which discussed vote dilution under section 2 of the 
VRA, and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901–902 (1996), which discussed racial 
gerrymandering).
99 See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 356 (1981) (showing a reapportionment or 
election law case after 1964 where the SG did not submit an amicus brief). 
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perceived importance of the case.100 Perhaps it is surprising that the 
SG as amicus participated in as many cases as he did. When the 
United States is not a party to the suit, or when the suit does not seem 
to directly affect any particular interest of the federal government, it 
may not be obvious why the SG is filing an amicus brief at all. 
Similarly, while, as in Baker, the SG’s decision to file a brief is often 
attributed to stark political considerations that are not expressly 
referenced by the SG in the amicus brief or otherwise. Indeed, the 
politically charged nature of cases may sometimes lead the SG, contra 
Baker, to decline to file an amicus brief.101
Consider the statements of the “interests of the United States” 
found in the amicus filings of the SG in these cases. No such 
statement is found in the SG’s amicus briefs filed in Baker. But at 
oral argument in the case, Cox soothingly told the Court the United 
States was participating because it involved the constitutional rights
of “a large number of citizens both in Tennessee and elsewhere,” the 
“integrity of the electoral process,” and “of course, a difficult and 
delicate question concerning the proper role of the judiciary” in 
reviewing reapportionment cases.102 Similar reasons are found in the 
SG’s briefs filed in later reapportionment cases.103 In contrast, the 
SG’s briefs filed in VRA cases state that the United States’ interest 
flows from the attorney general being statutorily designated to 
enforce provisions of the VRA.104 The outcome of such a case, even 
when the United States is not a party, can affect how the attorney 
general will enforce the VRA in other litigation.
100 See Pacelle, supra note 45, at 319–25 (stating the different factors that play into 
whether the SG submits an amicus brief in a particular case).
101 Consider that the SG did not file amicus briefs in the two major cases concerning the 
justiciability of federal court suits against partisan gerrymandering, Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109 (1986), and Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), and that the SG did not participate 
as amicus in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The SG did participate as amicus in League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, but his brief addressed only the VRA 
issue, not the challenge to the propriety of a mid-decade redistricting. See Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 9–11, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05–204, 05–276, 05–439), 2006 WL 271820, at *III 
(providing an overview of the brief’s legal arguments).
102 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 137.
103 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–4, Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. 368 (1963) (No. 112), 1962 WL 115856, at *3 (discussing the United State’s reasons for 
participating); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–4, Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 
397 U.S. 50 (1970) (No. 938), 1969 WL 136918, at *3–4 (same). 
104 E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1, League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05–204, 05–276, 05–439), 2006 
WL 271820, at *1; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1, 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83–1968), 1985 WL 669641, at *1; Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981) (No. 80–180), 
1980 WL 339768, at *1.
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In other words, in the latter cases the United States has a direct 
interest, while in the former the governmental interest is, at best, 
indirect. This dichotomy is reflective of the decision of the SG to file 
an amicus brief in any case. In the latter cases, the government may 
be concerned with its enforcement powers, or otherwise have some 
direct interest, while in the former cases, the government is pursuing a 
broader political or social agenda, unrelated to any direct interest of 
or impact on the federal government.105 As noted, Baker and the other 
early reapportionment cases clearly fell into the broader political 
agenda category, and to their credit, the officials in the three 
presidential administrations who filed the briefs made no pretense 
otherwise.106 Still, the amicus filings in some post-Baker cases pushed 
the category to almost the logical breaking point. Consider the SG 
filing amicus briefs in the cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
regarding whether the one-person, one-vote principle applied to the 
districts for local governmental units.107 What possible interest could 
the federal government have in the outcome of such a case?108
Commentary on Baker v. Carr and its contemporary cases has
been right to focus on the SG’s amicus briefs filed in those cases, 
since there is some evidence that the briefs influenced the decision
making of the justices, and perhaps in other ways. This Article
extends that discussion to the SG’s amicus filings in later 
reapportionment and other election law cases. The nature and extent 
of that influence, both in Baker and later cases, is a complex matter
that resists easy generalization. Whether and how the Court, or 
individual justices, were influenced in any given case can depend on, 
105 Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 595, 599 (1986); Pacelle, supra note 45, at 320.
106 An exception to this generalization might be Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), 
which involved the state drawing of districts for elections to the U.S. House of Representatives.
The SG’s amicus brief in that case observed that the “federal government’s interest is perhaps 
even greater in this case than in Baker v. Carr since fair representation in the federal legislature, 
Congress itself, is involved.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (No. 22), 1963 WL 105668, at *2. Perhaps Congress itself should 
have filed an amicus brief in the case, rather than relying on the SG. See Amanda Frost, 
Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 914 (2012). 
107 See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (SG filed a brief); Avery v. 
Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967) (same).
108 In contrasting the “institutional” and “administration” roles of the SG, David Strauss 
notes that under some conceptions of the former role, the Executive Branch arguably had no 
particular interest in reapportionment cases, and thus should not have filed amicus briefs in 
those cases. David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1998, at 165, 171. He argues, in contrast, that if the 
reapportionment cases had been brought under the Guarantee Clause, which states that the 
“United States shall guarantee to every State . . . a republican Form of Government,” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added), then there would have been a better argument for a 
federal government interest in those cases. Strauss, supra note 108, at 171 n.11.
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among other things, the legal and political context of the case prior to 
the decision, the dynamics among the justices in deciding the case 
and rendering a decision, the reaction anticipated by the Court, and 
the actual reaction to the case. Perhaps we should ask whether 
influence goes in the other direction as well, or even instead. The 
decision of the SG to file an amicus brief, and the content of that 
brief, might be influenced in part by the expectation that the Court 
wants such a brief or to satisfy constituencies other than the Court.109
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL SAFEGUARDS OF BAKER V. CARR
So far, this Article has been largely Court-centric, focusing on the 
Supreme Court’s decisions and the activity of the litigants and amici 
in particular cases. A full understanding of the Reapportionment 
Revolution also requires an appreciation of actors affected by the 
cases, but not directly involved in a particular case. The focus of the 
present section of this Article is on Congress. 
The Constitution’s Elections Clause110 vests power in Congress to 
regulate the process of electing members of Congress within each 
state, with the default power vested in the states themselves. Congress 
has enacted statutes under that Clause, ranging from an 1842 law that 
mandates that states electing more than one member of the House of 
Representatives do so by districts111 to the Help America Vote Act of 
2002.112 On the whole, though, the states have been the principal 
regulators of congressional and state legislative elections. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of congressional action has played a 
prominent role in reapportionment litigation. Justice Frankfurter in 
Colegrove emphasized that Congress had authority to regulate the 
drawing of districts for congressional elections within states, and 
argued that courts entering this “political thicket” would invade the 
prerogatives of Congress.113 Other opinions have similarly referenced
109 Graham, supra note 44, at 266; Pacelle, supra note 45, at 319. As noted earlier, the 
Court sometimes requests that the SG file an amicus brief in the case. See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text.
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators.”).
111 1842 Apportionment Act, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842).
112 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2006)). For other examples of congressional action under the 
Elections Clause, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to 
Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5 (2010).
113 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–56 (1946). 
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the Elections Clause in calling for judicial noninterference in some 
reapportionment litigation.114
A. Congressional Reaction to the Reapportionment Cases in the 
1960s
Congress considered various statutory and constitutional responses 
in the wake of Baker. As previously observed,115 the standard account 
is that some opposition in Congress arose in the immediate aftermath 
of the reapportionment cases, but it soon melted away given the 
popularity of those decisions and the lack of support for restrictions 
within Congress itself. That account is accurate as far as it goes, but,
to some extent, it understates the depth and complexity of 
congressional reaction to the reapportionment and related cases.
Many state governmental officials, and interest groups 
representing states, mobilized in the immediate aftermath of Baker.
Most notable were proposals by the Council of State Governments to 
amend the Constitution to abolish all substantive guarantees against 
malapportionment, to establish a “Court of the Union,” comprised of 
all fifty states’ supreme court chief justices with the power to review 
Supreme Court decisions, and to make it easier to amend the 
Constitution.116 Much discussion on these proposals took place at 
various public and private venues in 1962 and 1963, and seventeen 
state legislatures eventually passed resolutions calling for passage of 
one or more of them.117 But the proposals attracted relatively little 
attention to begin with, and upon encountering opposition from 
President Kennedy, the American Bar Association, and other leaders 
and elites from across the political spectrum, the movement behind 
the proposals lost steam.118
Congress apparently paid relatively little attention to Baker itself, 
but its attention picked up after the 1963 and 1964 decisions, 
particularly Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases, which reached 
the merits of Baker-sanctioned attacks on state drawing of legislative 
districts, including those for the U.S. House of Representatives. Not 
114 E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275–77 (2004) (explaining that the Election 
Clause suggested that Congress, not the courts, had the primary role in regulating political 
gerrymandering of congressional districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 42–45 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Elections Clause suggested that the one-person, one-vote 
principle did not apply to drawing of districts for the House of Representatives).
115 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
116 William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why 
Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 534–35 (2002).
117 For an extremely useful and detailed account of the state reaction to Baker, see id. at
529–52.
118 Id. at 552–85.
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surprisingly, the bipartisan opposition was particularly animated in 
some quarters of the House, since some incumbents there (unlike in 
the Senate) electorally benefitted from malapportioned districts. 
Opposition in the House was led by Democratic Representative 
William Tuck of Virginia, and in the Senate by Everett Dirksen, the 
Republican Minority leader from Illinois. Numerous bills were 
introduced in both chambers, which would have variously limited the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts over reapportionment cases, or 
delayed the implementation of court orders requiring 
reapportionment. A bill to limit federal court jurisdiction over such 
cases passed the House by the comfortable margin of 242 to 148, with 
the support of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans, but 
proposals for similar limits languished in the Senate, despite the 
support of Dirksen. Once again, a variety of groups across the 
political spectrum, inside and outside of Congress, opposed the 
proposals.119
The reapportionment decisions were also discussed in the 1964 
presidential campaign. President Lyndon Baines Johnson, at least 
through his agents in the Department of Justice, expressed opposition 
to the bills in Congress, but the issue was not addressed in the 
platform of the Democratic Party, and he said little about the cases 
during the campaign.120 In contrast, the conservative Republican 
nominee for president, Senator Barry Goldwater, criticized the 
reapportionment cases as part of his broader critique of Warren Court 
decisions which, he argued, demonstrated judicial overreaching and 
invaded the prerogatives of the states. The Republican platform 
supported measures that would permit at least one part of a bicameral 
legislature to be malapportioned, and thus limit or overrule cases like 
Reynolds v. Sims.121 President Johnson said little in response, but 
various luminaries in the legal establishment criticized Goldwater on 
that front, and ultimately Goldwater’s “sharp criticisms of the Court 
probably had little impact on the election.”122
119 For detailed accounts of the activity in Congress in 1964, see ANSOLABEHERE &
SNYDER, supra note 7, at 178–80, CORTNER, supra note 7, at 236–42, DIXON, supra note 7, at 
385–86, 394–97, and Robert B. McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 255 (1964).
120 McKay, supra note 119, at 266–67. Earlier, top officials from the Department of 
Justice, including SG Cox, had met with the aides of Senators Dirksen and Mike Mansfield to 
discuss a “compromise” bill which only would have placed time limits on the implementation of 
federal court orders in reapportionment cases. But this compromise encountered opposition as 
well. Id. at 263–65.
121 William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 391, 427–33 (2002).
122 Id. at 434.
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With the seating of a new Congress in 1965, Senator Dirksen 
renewed his efforts to propose a Constitutional amendment that 
matched the provision in the 1964 Republican platform. In August of 
that year, the proposal passed the Senate fifty-nine to thirty-nine, but 
that was seven votes short of the minimum necessary to send it to the 
states. Opposition outside of Congress continued to fester, but it too 
faded, in part due to the many court-ordered reapportionments that 
were taking place.123 By 1968, one or both houses in the legislatures 
of forty-nine states had been reapportioned, either by court order or 
due to the voluntary actions of legislators.124 And to some degree the 
response to Baker was overtaken by the far more negative reaction to 
contemporary Warren Court decisions involving school prayer and 
criminal justice.125
So, the congressional reaction to Baker and its progeny was 
somewhat more complicated and extended than usually presented. 
What accounted for the ultimately muted response by Congress, and 
how was the Court affected by that response? On the former question, 
scholars of Court-congressional relations have identified several 
factors that may explain the reaction in Congress, through 
jurisdiction-curbing legislative proposals or otherwise, to Court 
123 For details on the activity of supporters and opponents of the anti–reapportionment 
proposals inside and outside of Congress, see ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 180–
82, CORTNER, supra note 7, at 242–46, and DIXON, supra note 7, at 402–15. Dirksen continued 
efforts to pass his proposal. It passed the Senate again in 1966, albeit by fifty–five to thirty–
eight—less than a two–thirds supermajority. Formal opposition to the reapportionment cases 
largely ended with Dirksen’s death in 1969. By that time, though, it appears that no less than 
thirty–three of the required thirty–four state legislatures had issued calls for the convening of a 
constitutional convention to consider adopting the Dirksen proposal or its equivalent. CORTNER,
supra note 7, at 246. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The 
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 765–89 (1993)
(listing thirty–two states which at one time had issued such calls). See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The 
Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949 (1968) and
Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty–four: The Constitutional Case for a 
Constitutional Convention, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 837 (2011) for commentary regarding 
whether such calls are still legally viable.
124 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 253.
125 See JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974
565–68 (1996) (highlighting Supreme Court decisions that enhanced civil liberties and the 
subsequent reactions of the political right); CORTNER, supra note 7, at 223–26 (discussing how 
the opposition to Court decisions on religion and criminal justice during this period also 
increased the number of critics of the Court). To be sure, there might well have been 
connections between the more controversial Warren Court decisions and the reapportionment 
cases, but the strictly doctrinal connections were limited. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The 
Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV., 59, 83–84
(acknowledging that reapportionment cases “say nothing explicit about race,” but arguing that 
malapportioned legislatures were to the political detriment of urban blacks, and linking cases to 
broader racial agenda of the Warren Court); C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the 
Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 869 (1964) (drawing connections between Brown and 
Baker).
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decisions. These factors include the policy agenda of Congress and its 
view of the policy consequences of Court decisions; differing views 
of proper constitutional interpretation between members of Congress 
and the majority of the Court; the salience of particular issues; the 
presence or absence of interest group activity on an issue; and the 
support (or lack thereof) inside and outside of Congress for the 
Court’s attention to and resolution of a particular issue.126
Application of these factors sheds greater light on the response of 
Congress to the reapportionment cases and the ultimate failure of the 
constitutional and statutory proposals to overturn or limit the 
decisions or restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. We can 
stipulate that at least some of the negative response by some members 
of Congress was simply due to substantive disagreement with the 
interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions by the majority 
of the Court.127 Other opposition was driven by the anticipated 
electoral or policy consequences of the inevitable reapportioned 
nature of state legislatures, and of the districts for House members.128
126 For more extensive discussion of these factors, see generally CHARLES GARDNER 
GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE (2006) (providing discussion about the emerging 
trends for Congress and the Court to try and exert control over the other); Neal Devins, 
Congress and Judicial Supremacy, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 45 (Bruce 
Peabody ed., 2011) (examining Congress’s willingness to criticize the Court’s decision making 
but hesitancy to take action that restricts the Court’s authority); Miller, supra note 41
(highlighting the intersection of law and politics and the different methods political scientists 
use to study that intersection); Grove, supra note 5, at 883–84 (pointing out how the 
confirmation procedures for justices ensure their political views align, at least in part, with some 
members of the legislature and consequently are at odds with the views of others).
127 See CORTNER, supra note 7, at 243 (discussing congressional hearings on the Dirksen 
amendment); DIXON, supra note 7, at 386 (commenting on the development of the measure 
introduced by Dirksen). In contrast, at least one prominent contemporary observer dismissed the 
constitutional discussion as grandstanding, since (referring to the Tuck bill) he opined that the 
House did not “seriously intend the enactment of this drastic legislation.” McKay, supra note
119, at 269. But that observation should be tempered by the fact that the same observer later 
enthusiastically endorsed the reapportionment cases; see generally Robert B. McKay, 
Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968) (providing 
remarks on why the reapportionment cases were so successful and how the results were, 
comparatively, so easily achieved). This is an illustration of the difficulty of objectively 
determining how seriously Congress discharges its obligation to consider constitutional issues in 
the legislative process. See generally Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional 
Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011) (arguing 
that congressional committees in recent years have paid less and less attention to Constitutional 
issues); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525, 525 (2009) (arguing that 
asking “whether Congress is capable of conscientious, responsible constitutional interpretation” 
is not the proper question); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the 
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983) (discussing how Congress should be more active in 
evaluating potential constitutional shortcomings of legislation); Mark Tushnet, Is Congress 
Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional Interpretation?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499 
(2009) (contending “conceptual problems and institutional features” within Congress make it 
difficult to determine whether Congress has the ability to appropriately consider Constitutional 
issues).
128 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 244–45.
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On the other hand, there was ideological support for the decisions in 
Congress and leading interest groups.129 And the likely political 
consequences of the decisions generated support for the 
reapportionment decisions in Congress and the executive branch.130
Indeed, it has been argued that many of the reapportioned legislatures 
in the 1960s largely inured to the electoral benefit of Democrats (as 
the Kennedy administration had predicted), because many then extant
malapportioned plans had favored Republicans.131 Though there were 
Democrats of many different ideological stripes in the 1960s, that 
party nonetheless controlled both chambers of Congress and the 
presidency during the decade until 1969. All of these factors 
combined with the support for the reapportionment cases from the 
interested public to doom congressional proposals to restrict the 
cases.
How much did the Supreme Court react to the anticipated or actual 
congressional opposition when rendering the reapportionment cases? 
On balance, the answer seems to be very little. The opinions 
characteristically say nothing about this topic, though several of the 
justices, in the course of public remarks, unusually made direct and 
critical reference to the earlier opposition to Baker at the state level.132
Addressing this issue from a broader perspective, empirical studies 
have suggested that the Court, to certain degrees, does take into 
account the anticipated or actual negative reaction in Congress when 
it renders constitutional law decisions.133 But even if that is true as a 
whole, it does not characterize the Court’s reapportionment cases. 
Part of the reason, it would seem, is that a majority of the Court was 
not oblivious to the support of the executive branch, principally 
though not only through the SG’s amicus briefs. The justices were 
129 Id. at 243.
130 Members of Congress may welcome Supreme Court intervention in order to overcome 
entrenched political opponents. The inherent difficulty of nonjudicial means for legislators to 
change malapportioned legislatures is a classic example. Whittington, supra note 64, at 587–89. 
The president may find it appropriate to oppose restrictions on federal court jurisdiction, since 
federal courts are an important venue for executive enforcement of federal law, or simply a 
forum to advance his general policy objectives. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards 
of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250 (2012).
131 GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 22–24 (2002).
132 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 223, 225 (reporting criticisms in speeches in 1963 by Chief 
Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and Goldberg).
133 See TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 18–24 (2011) (noting how 
the Supreme Court uses court–curbing bills, among other things, to understand its current level 
of institutional legitimacy and public support); Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. 
Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional 
Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89 (2011) (describing how the Court, at least 
in part, takes into account the current support for legislation in Congress when considering 
constitutional challenges to that legislation).
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presumably also not oblivious to the Democratic majorities in 
Congress at the time, which might have led them to conclude that 
efforts to limit federal court involvement on this issue were unlikely 
to succeed. Most of negative reaction in Congress, it might be said, 
came too late: immediately after Baker or even Wesberry (decided in 
February of 1964) would have been the optimal time for opponents to 
strike. But most of the reaction took place after Reynolds and its 
companion cases in June of 1964 and reapportionment of 
congressional and state legislative districts, was well underway in 
1964 and 1965.134
In some ways, the Court itself controlled the rapidity of this line of 
decisions. All of the reapportionment decisions starting with Baker
were direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district courts, and 
the Court could not have been unaware of that fact and the rapid 
nature of appeals from such decisions, as compared to the normal 
appellate process. The Court was able to promptly accept review of 
such appeals and decide them in relatively quick fashion.135 A long 
series of reapportionment cases strung out over several years, in 
contrast, might have given opponents, inside and outside of Congress, 
more time to effectively mobilize. Finally, to some extent the 
constitutional heavy lifting was accomplished in the 1964 cases. The 
Court would continue to decide reapportionment cases throughout the 
1960s, but many were not blockbuster decisions.136 The relatively 
clear mandate of the one-person, one-vote principle, and the complete 
enforcement and (if perhaps grudging in some places) compliance by 
other political institutions (i.e., federal and state courts, and state 
legislatures) combined to limit the controversy over the decisions.
B. The Three-Judge District Court in Reapportionment and Voting 
Rights Act Cases
The story of the institution of the three-judge district court 
illustrates how Congress has influenced reapportionment litigation by 
134 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 178–82 (describing reapportionment 
activities in 1964 and 1965). 
135 Id. at 170–72 (describing how many reapportionment challenges were filed and litigated 
before three–judge district courts shortly after Baker was decided in March of 1962 or already 
being litigated before Baker, with many direct appeals of such cases reaching the Court in 1963 
and 1964); CORTNER, supra note 7, at 184–86 (providing further details on the apportionment 
cases that were on the road to the Court shortly after Baker); id. at 192 n.1 (shortly after 
Reynolds and its companion cases were decided, the Court disposed of and remanded by per 
curiam opinions pending appeals from reapportionment decisions from nine states). 
136 Michael E. Solimine, The Causes and Consequences of the Reapportionment 
Revolution, 1 ELECTION L.J. 579, 581 (2002) [hereinafter Solimine, Causes] (reviewing COX &
KATZ, supra note 131, noting that the Court did not again decide any important reapportionment 
cases involving congressional districting until the late 1960s and 1970s).
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providing a special forum for the litigation of those cases. Congress 
did not intentionally set out to do so. The story begins long before 
Baker in 1908, when the Court decided Ex parte Young,137 holding 
that federal judges could enjoin the enforcement of state statutes 
(regulating railroad rates) which violated federal constitutional rights 
of railroads. The case was extremely controversial for its time, since it 
clarified that states could be sued in federal courts (by enjoining state 
officials),138 and was perceived as yet another decision by a 
conservative Court striking down Progressive Era legislation.139
Congress responded to the decision by creating a three-judge district 
court to hear Ex parte Young-like challenges to statewide legislation. 
The court consisted of a district judge before whom the case was 
originally filed, joined by two other judges (typically one circuit 
judge and one district judge, usually from the same state) appointed 
by the Chief Judge of the relevant circuit, with a direct appeal of its 
decision to the Supreme Court. The premise behind the court was that 
three judges, rather than one, might better consider the important and 
delicate task of assessing the constitutionality of state statutes; that 
any such decision might be better received than a decision by a sole 
district judge; and that a direct appeal would make it easier for the 
Supreme Court to promptly resolve the case.140
While originally framed as a liberal break on conservative federal 
judges to protect state prerogatives, in subsequent decades the three-
judge district court in some quarters came to constitute almost the 
opposite premise. After World War II, many civil rights cases in 
Southern states, challenging state provisions that discriminated 
against African Americans, were litigated before such courts. The 
attorneys that brought such suits came to conclude that they were 
more likely to succeed before three federal judges, as opposed to just 
one, possibly hostile jurist, with the added benefit of a prompt direct 
appeal to the Supreme Court, which by the 1950s and 1960s came to 
be seen as a sympathetic forum for their causes.141 To be sure, the 
early reapportionment cases, which were all challenges to statewide 
137 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
138 Id. at 155–56.
139 Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three–Judge 
District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 101 (2008) [hereinafter Solimine, Congress].
140 The three-judge district court statute is now codified, as amended, in 28 U.S.C. § 2284 
(2006), and the direct appeal provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006). A discussion of 
Ex parte Young and the congressional reaction to it, which culminated in the 1910 statute, is 
found in Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 104–18. 
141 Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 125–34. The most notable example of this 
litigation strategy is Brown v. Board of Educucation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Solimine, Congress,
supra note 139, at 126–28.
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laws and hence fell under the coverage of the three-judge district 
court, did not particularly benefit from being litigated in those courts. 
Plaintiffs in Baker v. Carr142 and most (though not all) other cases143
initially lost below, but they were able to promptly appeal losses to 
what turned out to be a sympathetic Supreme Court.
Shortly after the Court’s first round of reapportionment cases, 
Congress affirmatively embraced the three-judge district court as the 
appropriate and sympathetic forum to adjudicate certain cases under 
the VRA, passed in 1965. Under section 5 of the VRA, as it stands 
now, nine Southern states, and some subsections of other states, must 
seek preclearance from the federal government before changing 
certain voting provisions. The requirement is premised on historic 
discrimination in those states against the voting rights of African
Americans and other minorities. Those jurisdictions can seek 
preclearance by obtaining the permission of the Department of 
Justice, or by filing a declaratory judgment action before a three-
judge district court in the District of Columbia.144
Placing these cases in that venue was a matter of controversy. The 
congressional rationale appears to have been based on venue 
requirements for actions against federal officials, many of whom 
work in the District of Columbia, and more substantively on the 
notion that the VRA would be more expansively interpreted, and 
receive more of a uniform application, by the presumably 
nonparochial federal judges in the District of Columbia. Absent this 
provision, preclearance actions would have been litigated in federal 
courts in the affected states, before local federal judges who, 
Congress apparently presumed, might be more sympathetic to state 
interests and less to the requirements of the VRA.145 Not surprisingly, 
142 369 U.S. 186 (1962), rev’d 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) (per curiam) (three–
judge court). For a discussion of the three judges in the district court in Tennessee and the 
proceedings before them, see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 60–69.
143 See e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1964), rev’d Wesberry v. Vandiver, 
206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (three–judge court) (reversing the dismissal of plaintiffs 
complaint); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964), aff’d Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 
431 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (affirming the District Court’s finding for 
plaintiffs); Lucas v. Forty–Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964), rev’d
Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963) (three-judge court) (reversing the dismissal of 
plaintiffs claim). 
144 42 U.S.C. § 1973b–c (2006); 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51 (2011). For further details on the 
preclearance provisions and their application by courts, see DIMINO, SMITH & SOLIMINE, supra
note 21, at 225–83.
145 See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 16–20 (1987) (discussing controversial measures of the VRA); J. 
Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–2007,
86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 681 (2008) (discussing the legislative history of adding Section 5 to the 
VRA); see also, Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 132–33 (discussing possible rationales 
for vesting judicial preclearance in a three–judge district court in the District of Columbia).
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southern Democrats in both chambers were among the leaders of the 
congressional opposition to this provision, including Representative 
Tuck.146 Perhaps surprisingly, given his opposition at the time to the 
reapportionment cases, among the congressional leaders supporting 
the provision was Senator Dirksen.147 The VRA survived a 
constitutional challenge the year after passage in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach.148 There, the majority acknowledged the burden on state 
governments of litigating cases in the District of Columbia, but found
it a permissible exercise of congressional power to regulate the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.149 Justice Hugo Black dissented in 
part on the basis (echoing congressional critics) that the preclearance 
provision forced states “to entreat federal authorities in far-away 
places for approval of local laws.”150 The VRA and the preclearance 
component have been reauthorized by Congress in 1970, 1975, 1982, 
and 2006, and the exclusive venue of the District of Columbia court 
has not been revisited.151
146 THERNSTROM, supra note 145, at 19–20 (quoting Tuck).
147 For a detailed discussion of the Senate opposition to the District of Columbia venue for 
preclearance actions and Dirksen’s role in overcoming it, see Gyung–Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller 
& Itai Sened, Closing the Deal: Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
588, 599–601 (2009).
148 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
149 Id. at 331.
150 Id. at 359 (Black, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court subsequently engaged in some 
revisionist history in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 562–63 (1969), when it stated 
that federalism concerns raised by federal court review of state voting procedures called for a 
special court to convene to resolve those concerns. This suggests that the District of Columbia 
court was deemed to be protective of state prerogatives, when Congress seemed to hold the 
opposite assumption.
151 Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of 
Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 784 n.76 (2007) [hereinafter 
Solimine, Institutional Process] (Congress rejected subsequent efforts to extend the venue of 
preclearance actions). The preclearance provision has recently been the subject of constitutional 
attack, on the basis that the law exceeds the powers of Congress, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (not reaching such a challenge to the 
2006 reauthorization of the VRA since case resolved on other grounds), and been the subject of 
considerable scholarly literature, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 17 (Guy–Uriel E. Charles, 
Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011) [hereinafter RACE, REFORM, AND 
REGULATION]; Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting, Race, and the Voting Rights Act, 3 NAT’L
AFF., Spring 2010, at 52; Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act 
Preclearance, 49 HOW. L.J. 785 (2006), but there has apparently been little if any discussion of 
modifying the venue for preclearance actions. It is worth noting that litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of Section 5 continues. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F.Supp.2d 424 
(D.D.C. 2011) –(upholding constitutionality of section 5), aff’d, No. 11–5256, 2012 WL 
1759997 (May 18, 2012) The latter case was decided by a single district judge, unlike the three–
judge district court that considered the NAMUNDO case. The difference is due to the plaintiff in 
NAMUNDO having requested a bailout under section 5, which is heard by a three-judge district 
court. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 508; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5) (2006).
In contrast, the plaintiff in Shelby County did not request a bailout or preclearance, but simply 
asked for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of that provision. Shelby Cnty.,811 
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Congress revisited the use of the three-judge district court in the 
1970s. While that court had been perceived to be a welcome device 
by some civil rights plaintiffs, it became increasingly unpopular 
among many federal judges and Supreme Court justices. Their 
opposition was based on the administrative burdens on the three 
judges sitting in a trial capacity; the relatively large number of cases 
in the 1950s and 1960s that went before such courts; and the burden 
on the Supreme Court to hear and dispose of the numerous, ostensibly 
mandatory, direct appeals from such courts, when otherwise many 
appeals would have been resolved in the circuit courts with only 
review by certiorari thereafter.152 By the early 1970s, the Supreme 
Court, the American Law Institute, a distinguished committee 
appointed by Chief Justice Warren Burger, and others had called for 
the abolition of the three-judge district court, casting their arguments 
in wholly practical, nonideological terms.153 Congress took up the 
proposals, and although the NAACP and other civil rights 
organizations opposed the change, bipartisan support was too strong 
and the repeal passed in 1976.154
Some of the abolitionists had argued that the three-judge district 
court should continue to be used for certain types of controversial 
matters, such as reapportionment cases. The precise rationale for such 
an exception was never made clear. The unelaborated argument was 
made that the court ought to be used for such cases because of their 
asserted “public importance” and the need for the “public acceptance” 
of such decisions.155 While the supposed widespread acceptance of 
the reapportionment decisions is frequently asserted, perhaps the 
decennial practice of federal courts reviewing the actions of state 
legislatures on districting was unsettling, in the minds of some 
members of Congress (and even some judges), and they concluded 
that three federal judges undertaking that task should be left intact. 
Likewise, members of Congress may have thought that 
reapportionment cases were genuinely difficult to resolve and that 
F.Supp.2d at 427. .The same judge in parallel litigation held that a three-judge district court 
need not be convened to hear such a case. Laroque v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156, 165–66 
(D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
152 Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 134–37 (discussing opposition among federal 
judges and others).
153 Id. at 138–41.
154 Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 
2284 (2006)). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the repeal, see Solimine, 
Congress, supra note 139, at 141–48.
155 Id. at 142 (referring to congressional testimony by well–known federal judges Henry J. 
Friendly and J. Skelly Wright).
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three minds were better than one. Finally, some members may have 
thought that some (perhaps many) federal judges were inevitably 
prone to partisan decision making when reviewing the districts drawn 
by state legislatures, and that such partisanship might be diluted when 
three federal judges heard the case rather than one.156 The enacted 
legislation contained the exception.
How has the three-judge district court worked in such cases since 
1976?157 This question is difficult to answer, since the perceived 
importance or acceptance of such cases is difficult to measure, as 
would be a comparison to the decision making in these cases by 
single district judges, with normal appellate review thereafter, had the 
court been totally abolished. Some efforts have been made to analyze 
the composition of and decision making by three-judge district courts
and litigant behavior in reapportionment cases, which can shed light 
on the question. 
Both before and after the 1976 amendment, the Chief Judge of the 
circuit in which the case is filed is statutorily tasked with appointing 
the two additional members of the panel.158 Prior to the amendment, 
there is some evidence that in some civil rights cases in the 1960s, 
Chief Judges would occasionally appear to “stack” the composition of 
the panel to achieve a presumably favorable outcome, especially 
when the judge to whom the case was originally assigned seemed 
hostile to the enforcement of civil rights.159 Assuming such stacking 
sometimes took place, did it happen in reapportionment cases? Not so 
156 Id. at 144–45.
157 For an overview of the operation of three-judge district courts in election law cases, see 
Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433,
455–67. Many reapportionment cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause are coupled 
with claims under the VRA. While the exception does not textually cover the latter claims, the 
exception has been construed to apply to cases where both claims are raised. Page v. Bartels, 
248 F.3d 175, 187–91 (3d Cir. 2001) (illustrating this point); Michael E. Solimine, The Three–
Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 79, 95–97 (1996)
[hereinafter Solimine, Three-Judge District Court]. Also, states covered by section 5 may need 
to have their reapportionment plans reviewed by two different three–judge district courts. See, 
e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 941–43 (2012) (per curiam) (while waiting for decision by 
three–judge district court in D.C. on section 5 preclearance review, three–judge district court in 
Texas must defer to initial redrawing of districts by the Texas legislature when drawing interim 
maps). 
158 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1)(2006). Usually, cases are randomly assigned to federal district 
judges, and three-judge panels on the Courts of Appeals are randomly constituted. J. Robert 
Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Courts of Appeals, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1041 (2000).
159 For an overview and evaluation of the evidence, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to 
Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1729 (1993) (describing 
evidence); Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 110–16. Most of evidence 
concerns the alleged stacking by Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit, an Eisenhower 
appointee from Georgia with notably progressive views on civil rights and race. Id. at 111–12.
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much, it appears.160 The hearings that led up to the 1976 statutory 
change appear not to have directly addressed the issue.161 One study 
of eighty-nine cases (many of them reapportionment matters) decided 
after the amendment, from 1976 to 1994, indicates that in only five 
cases was more than one circuit judge added to the panel, and in 
seventy-three cases all of the judges were from one state, leading to 
the conclusion that “a highly politicized composition process” had not 
taken place.162 On the other hand, the same study reported a survey 
taken of Chief Judges and circuit executives in 1995. The survey 
indicated that purely administrative reasons were employed to decide 
who would serve on the panel, but responses from at least two circuits
indicated that the Chief Judges would sometimes overtly attempt to 
balance the panel politically, given the politically consequential 
nature of reapportionment cases.163 Perhaps it was used in other 
circuits as well. This milder form of stacking might be applauded as 
an effort to create the appearance (and actuality) of fairness in such 
cases, or criticized as an inappropriate overt step that institutionalizes 
judicial partisanship.164
The purported stacking of three-judge panels raises the issue of 
whether federal judges are making partisan decisions in 
160 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (three–judge court) 
(2–1 decision), rev’d sub nom. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). In the district court,
Chief Judge Tuttle appointed himself, and Circuit Judge Griffin Bell, who also had a generally 
progressive record in civil rights cases, to the panel in an important reapportionment case, but 
Tuttle ended up dissenting in the case when Bell and the district judge found for the defendant. 
161 The legislative history of the amendment makes no direct reference to the alleged 
stacking issue, although it does characterize the Chief Judge’s role as “entirely ministerial.” 
Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 112 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94–1379, 
at 7 (1976)).
162 Id. at 114. The study did not directly examine the political composition of the appointed 
judges, and suggested more extensive study of that issue would be appropriate to more fully 
examine the possible “packing” phenomenon. Id. at 114–15. A recent study by Mark McKenzie, 
whose work I rely on below, see infra notes 170–74 & accompanying text, provides additional 
albeit indirect support for the conclusion that little overt stacking takes place. He studied the 
judicial behavior of members of three–judge district courts in 149 redistricting decisions from 
1981 to 2007. Rather than using the proxy of the party of the appointing president, he used the 
self–described partisan affiliation (if any) of the judges prior to their appointment. In only 
twenty–two of the 149 decisions were the panels made up entirely of the judges of one party 
(ten all Republican, twelve all Democratic). Of the remaining panels, forty–two had one 
Democrat, while fifty–nine had one Republican. Twenty six panels had one or more 
independents sitting. E–mail from Mark McKenzie, Assistant Professor of Political Science, 
Texas Tech University, to Michael E. Solimine, Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati 
College of Law (Oct. 12, 2011, 21:31 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter McKenzie email]. 
In compiling this data, Prof. McKenzie did not directly examine (nor did the study mentioned in 
the text) the process of appointment of any given panel, and the personnel options available to 
the appointing Chief Judge of the circuit for any particular case. But, if overt stacking by Chief 
Judges were taking place in these cases, presumably there would be more instances of all–
Republican or all–Democratic panels.
163 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 113.
164 For a discussion of the competing concerns, see id. at 127, 135.
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reapportionment cases and related election law cases. Many studies of 
decision making by federal judges assume their ideological 
preferences are the same as the presidents who appointed them, and 
that decisions in this context can be categorized as liberal or 
conservative, depending on whether the plaintiff or defendant 
prevailed in a case involving, say, the VRA.165 The assumption of 
much of the literature is that judges will attempt to favor the political 
party with whom they were affiliated in some way. But such studies 
must be used with caution in evaluating judicial performance in 
reapportionment and related cases. The oft-used proxy of the party of 
the appointing president can be a crude measure of presumed judicial 
ideology. Presidents occasionally name judges affiliated with the 
opposing political party, since lower court appointments can be 
influenced by the party affiliations of Senators from the state of 
appointment. Likewise, the precise nature of the reapportionment plan 
typically under review by a federal court needs to be examined to 
determine if a federal judge is supposedly favoring his or her party, 
rather than simply determining if a plaintiff or defendant prevails.166
Whatever measures are used, the empirical evidence on ideological 
or partisan voting by federal judges in reapportionment and related 
cases is mixed. Some studies have suggested that federal judges do 
act in partisan ways in considering the validity of reapportionment 
plans.167 Other studies have suggested that federal judges, on the 
whole, do not vote in overtly partisan ways in reapportionment and 
other related election law cases.168 Consider one recent, relatively 
165 For one representative study with these characteristics, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. 
Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1493 (2008) (empirical study of federal court decisions concerning section 2 of the VRA, 
using the party of the appointing president as a proxy for ideological preference of federal 
judges). This study did not specifically differentiate the voting of district judges sitting alone 
from those in three-judge district courts.
166 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 121–23 (discussing 
complexities of empirical study of judicial behavior in this context). See also Solimine, 
Institutional Process, supra note 151, at 789–90 (discussing the same). Similar difficulties 
attend the study of judicial review of racially gerrymandered districts. It is sometimes said that 
such districts, ostensibly established to aid the election of minorities, usually affiliated with the 
Democratic party, are supported by Republican operatives, to pack minority voters into one 
district and lessen their influence in other districts. So a judge who presumably favors the GOP 
may nonetheless be motivated to uphold the validity of such districts. Solimine, Causes, supra 
note 136, at 583. But see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and 
Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2011) (arguing against consensus that 
minority-majority districts, as required by the VRA, often hurt Democrats, due to diverse 
behavior by voters, and that such districts also constrain Republicans in the redistricting 
process).
167 See, e.g., Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research: 
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1995) (study of 
eighty–nine cases decided from 1964 to 1983).
168 See Solimine, Institutional Process, supra note 151, at 790–91 (reaching this 
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comprehensive study of 149 three-judge district court decisions from 
1981 to 2007.169 This study found that “partisanship matters” in 
reapportionment cases, but “partisan favoritism is conditioned by the 
type of legal case.”170 Thus, it found that in cases only concerning the 
one-person, one-vote principle, usually regarded as a fairly settled 
area of law, there was little partisan voting, but there was more 
partisanship for attacks on redistricting plans under the VRA, an area 
of law less settled.171 The study concluded that judicial partisanship 
was “constrained,” because if “judges were crass partisan actors . . . 
then they should uphold” more than they did state legislative 
districting plans formulated by their own parties.172
Other evidence suggests that federal judges act in distinctive ways 
in redistricting cases. Surveys of judges have confirmed that they are 
not oblivious to the political implications of redistricting decisions, 
and indeed some judges suggested that such cases led to animosity 
and a lack of collegiality within the panel.173 There are also higher 
rates of dissent in these cases, as compared to the low rate of dissent 
in three-judge panels in the courts of appeals in all cases.174 Judges 
might react in two ways to this stress. Some might compensate by 
taking the greatest care to exclude their own political considerations
from influencing their vote in the case. Others might take the opposite 
tack and, consciously or unconsciously, take political considerations 
conclusion from discussion of studies up till 2006, though acknowledging that there can be
individual cases that are exceptions to this generalization); Richard L. Hasen, Judges as 
Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND 
REGULATION, supra note 151, at 101, 104–08 (survey of empirical studies of voting by federal 
and state judges in election law cases).
169 Mark Jonathan McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on 
Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts, POL. RES. Q. (forthcoming), available at
http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/09/03/1065912911421012.abstract.
170 Id. at 9. The study used the “common space” score of judges, as a measure of presumed 
ideology, rather than automatically using the proxy of the party of the appointing president. Id.
at 6. “Common space” scores are predicated on measures of ideology of the appointing 
president and those of the Senators of the state from where the judge is appointed. See Lee 
Epstein, et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (discussing this 
method of measurement).
171 McKenzie, supra note 169, at 10.
172 Id. at 9.
173 Mark Jonathan McKenzie, Beyond Partisanship? Federal Courts, State Commissions, 
and Redistricting 154–55 (August 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas) 
(on file with author), available at http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/3367 
(summarizing results of survey of federal judges in redistricting cases).
174 Solimine, Three–Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 139, tbl.4 (in eighty–nine
three-judge court cases from 1976 to 1994, there were twenty–two dissents); McKenzie email, 
supra note 162 (reporting higher rates of dissent in study of 149 three–judge district court 
decisions from 1981 to 2007, than that typically found in three–judge panels on the Courts of 
Appeals). 
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into account if they perceive that is the proper and expected role of 
judges on a “politically balanced” panel.
Other aspects of decision making by three-judge district courts, as 
opposed to district judges acting alone, have been examined. One 
concern of such cases is that district judges might excessively defer to 
the votes of the circuit judge sitting on the panel. Studies have shown 
that circuit judges were not disproportionately authoring majority 
opinions in such cases.175 Another reason for leaving such panels 
intact to hear reapportionment cases is that three judges would better 
arrive at a decision in these often complicated cases than merely one. 
There seems almost universal agreement that these are indeed 
difficult cases, not only due to the potential complications of the 
substantive law, but because that abundant expert testimony on 
quantitative issues is often presented and must be digested by the 
court.176 It is difficult to objectively measure whether three judges, 
collectively acting, deal with or use such evidence better than one 
judge.177 No doubt, the conclusion on this score is often in the eye of 
the beholder. 
A final peculiarity of the three-judge district court is the 
availability of direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Studies have 
shown that appeals are filed in about 30 to 40 percent of such cases, 
which is higher than the typical rate of appeal for any given civil case 
decided by a district judge sitting alone.178 No doubt the discrepancy 
is due to the consequential nature of such decisions to the political 
operatives in the states, who are parties to or behind the litigation. On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court has often disposed of such 
putatively mandatory appeals in a summary fashion, which seems to 
175 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 117–20 (study of 89 decisions 
of such courts between 1976 and 1994).
176 D. James Greiner, The Quantitative Empirics of Redistricting Litigation: Knowledge, 
Threats to Knowledge, and the Need for Less Districting, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 527, 532–
38 (2011) (discussing problems associated with judicial use of sophisticated quantitative 
evidence in redistricting cases); Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 156, at 116–
17 (discussing the problems of generalized judges dealing with a specialized area of the law).
177 The study by McKenzie, supra note 169, found that the partisan composition of the 
panel had no effect on the individual voting behavior of judges. McKenzie email, supra note 
162 (commenting on findings not presented in forthcoming article). This suggests that the 
judges were reaching decisions free of undue influence of the other members of the panel. 
178 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 99. One treatise reports a 
significant diminution of direct appeals since the 1976 amendment, using data from selected 
Terms in various decades. GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 91 (reporting drop in such 
appeals, from three–judge district courts and certain district judges sitting alone, of 211 in 1971 
Term, to six and two in the 2003 and 2004 Terms, respectively). These figures may not take into 
account that the number of direct appeals would be expected to be higher in the early terms of 
any given decade, since reapportionment litigation generally takes place shortly after the 
redistricting that takes place early in a decade. Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 
157, at 108.
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diminish the asserted utility of permitting direct appeals.179 On 
balance, the possibility of a direct appeal probably does not much 
affect the behavior of the judges on a three-judge district court. The 
Supreme Court rarely reviews the decisions of lower courts (i.e., the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals and state supreme courts) in the normal 
appellate process. The same is true for direct appeals of three-judge 
district court decisions. Yet there is considerable evidence that the 
threat of review and reversal has a constraining effect on the behavior 
of lower court judges.180 That, combined with the presumed fact that 
most federal judges internalize, to various degrees, norms of stare 
decisis, and the highly salient nature of reapportionment cases inside 
and outside the legal community suggests that the members of a 
three-judge district court are no more likely to ignore law and 
precedent any more than their brethren (and themselves) when sitting 
outside of that court.181
Congress left the three-judge district court intact to decide 
“important” reapportionment cases, and the largely unarticulated 
presumption was that litigation before that court would be different 
than that before single district judges. The presumption might be well 
founded, though perhaps not in all ways contemplated by Congress in 
1976. While there is little evidence of overt stacking of such panels, 
there is some evidence, in some cases, that judges, consciously or not, 
take partisan considerations into account in their decision making. 
Nor is it clear that three judge panels render better or more accepted 
decisions, in any meaningful sense, than would one judge, with 
normal appellate review thereafter. The possibility of direct review by 
the Supreme Court has apparently not had much of a constraining 
effect, different from the normal appeal process that follows the 
decision of a district judge. It is thus difficult to settle on a facile 
conclusion regarding the efficacy of the three-judge district court in 
reapportionment and related cases since 1976.182
179 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 304–10; Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 
127 n.134.
180 For an overview of the considerable empirical literature that supports this proposition, 
see Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 535, 556–57 (2011).
181 Solimine, Three–Judge District Court, supra note 158, at 109.
182 Despite that ambiguous record, Congress since 1976 has created special three-judge 
district courts as forums to consider legal challenges to other federal statutes. For examples, see 
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 102–03 (listing seven such statutes enacted since 1986). 
Most notable in the election law field is the three-judge district court in the District of Columbia 
which hears legal challenges to various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, (2002), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 
437h. For discussion of that provision and its frequent use, see Douglas, supra note 157, at 455–
58; Solimine, Institutional Process, supra note 151, at 771–79. Recent examples of litigation 
before that court include Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (on review of three-
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Many of the reapportionment cases have suggested that Congress 
could and should take a more active role in regulating state 
reapportionment of electoral districts, at least for members of 
Congress. Those calls continue to the present day,183 though the 
support in Congress for such laws has been modest.184 No doubt, the 
inaction is because many incumbents in both parties prefer the status 
quo and the inability to forge a bipartisan consensus among those who 
do not prefer the status quo. If those proposals were to pass, it would 
seem that there would be less litigation challenging redistricting, and 
less work for three-judge district courts. But until that day arrives, the 
three-judge district court will be the main vehicle of congressional 
regulation of the state redistricting process. So far as I know, there 
have been no proposals to abolish the three-judge district court.185
Apparently, policymakers are satisfied with the status quo on that 
front as well.
CONCLUSION
Over forty years ago, one scholar of the reapportionment decisions 
argued that the decisions “primarily required acquiescence by state 
legislatures and state election officials, but it did not require positive 
support by either Congress or the president in order to be enforced 
effectively.”186 Strictly speaking, that is correct, but the thesis of this 
Article is that Baker v. Carr and the other reapportionment decisions 
of the early 1960s can only be understood and appreciated in light of 
the actions of the other branches of the federal government. The 
judge district court, holding unconstitutional BCRA provisions with limit independent 
expenditures by corporations and unions); Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012), aff’d mem.,
800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (upholding constitutionality of BCRA 
provisions barring political contributions by nonresident aliens).
183 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412, 
416–17 (2006) (proposing a federal administrative agency to regulate gerrymandering in all 50 
states); Joseph A. Peters, The Meaningful Vote Commission: Restraining Gerrymanders with a 
Federal Agency, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1051, 1060–63 (2010) (discussing a similar proposal); 
David Schultz, Regulating the Political Thicket: Congress, the Courts, and State 
Reapportionment Commissions, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 107, 139–43 (2008) (giving an 
overview of options for Congress). 
184 J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform To Rein 
in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 555 (2011) (reviewing 
congressional bills that would reform state redistricting by encouraging or mandating the use of 
bipartisan redistricting commissions, but concluding that congressional action in the near term is 
unlikely).
185 Other than myself. See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 126–
28 (arguing that the purported advantages of the court have been overstated, and that one district 
judge, with the normal appellate process thereafter, should hear reapportionment cases). 
186 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 260.
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executive branch supported the decisions ex post by the Solicitor 
General’s filing of amicus curiae briefs. In contrast, certain influential 
quarters of Congress criticized the decisions, and proposals that 
would have limited the impact of, or even overturned, the cases were 
given serious attention in Congress. Those efforts eventually did not 
prevail, though that failure may obscure some continuing, low–level 
opposition among elected state officials to federal court intervention 
in their redrawing of districts.187 Both strands of action by the other 
branches have continued to influence the judicial progeny of Baker
and of decisions regarding its first juridical cousin under the VRA.
The SG has since been frequently involved as a party or as an amicus 
in reapportionment, VRA, and other election law cases. Congress, for 
good or ill, has largely taken a hands-off attitude toward the 
adjudication of these cases, with the notable exception of maintaining 
the peculiar institution of the three-judge district court to hear such 
cases.188 In these ways, the federal courts have not been and are not 
autonomous institutions when reviewing the redistricting decisions of 
states.
APPENDIX: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS IN 
SUPREME COURT ELECTION LAW CASES, 1960-2011
Methodological note: for details on how the cases listed below 
were complied, see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. In 
addition, two cases listed by Hasen, in which the SG did file an 
amicus brief, see In re Heardon, 394 U.S. 399 (1969) (per curiam); 
Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), are not listed here, since they 
187 As one example, consider the reaction of William Batchelder, the Speaker of the Ohio 
House, to the possibility of such federal court intervention. In the wake of State ex rel. Ohioans 
for Fair Dists. v. Husted, 957 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio 2011), in which the Ohio Supreme Court held
that there could be a referendum to review the districting plan approved by the state legislature, 
Batchelder worried that the congressional redistricting plan would be reviewed and possibly 
changed “by unelected federal judges, who may be judges from Michigan, Kentucky or 
Tennessee.” Howard Wilkinson, Ruling Muddles Election Process: Congressional Races 
Thrown Into Chaos, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 16, 2011, at A1, A12. Batchelder was 
apparently referring to possible review by a three-judge district court, but past experience shows 
that such courts almost always are constituted of federal judges from the state in question. See
supra note 135 and accompanying text. To be fair to Batchelder, he was apparently unhappy 
with any “judicial interference in the [redistricting process],” id. at A12, from federal or state 
courts.
188 Members of Congress sometimes file amicus briefs in the reapportionment and other 
election law cases discussed in this article. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae 
Brief on Behalf of Appellees, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83–1968), 1985 
WL 669643; Brief of McConnell et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Crawford v. 
Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Nos. 07–21, 07–25), 2007 WL 4340890.
However, such briefs are filed much less often than those filed by the SG, and it appears to 
much less effect. See COLLINS, supra note 49, at 181–82.
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involved a contempt proceeding, and the issue of whether a pro se 
attorney may recover attorney’s fees, respectively, neither of which 
directly concerns the issues addressed in this article. The agreement 
or disagreement between the position taken by the SG, and the 
decision of the Court, is determined by the characterization of the 
SG’s position as listed in the Court’s decision and determined by the 
Reporter of Decisions, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 838-
42 (discussing use of these sources to characterize the position taken 
by amicus briefs), or through an examination of the content of the 
amicus brief. Any reference to the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in 
any of the opinions of the Court in a case is counted as a citation.
1. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); agree; no 
citation.
2. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); agree; no citation.
3. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); agree; citation.
4. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); agree; no 
citation.
5. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); agree; no citation.
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. 
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Commission for 
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. 
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 
(1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 
U.S. 713 (1964); agree; citation.
7. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); agree; no 
citation.
8. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966); agree; no citation.
9. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Sailors v. Board of 
Education of the County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105 (1967); 
disagree; no citation.
10. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); agree; no 
citation.
11. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); 
agree; citation.
12. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); agree; no citation.
110
1150 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4
13. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); disagree; no citation.
14. Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas 
City, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); agree; no citation.
15. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); CVSG; agree; 
no citation.
16. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 
636 (1976); disagree; citation.
17. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); disagree; 
citation.
18. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); disagree; 
citation.
19. Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190 (1978); CVSG; disagree; 
citation.
20. Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U.S. 
32 (1978); agree; citation.
21. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); disagree; 
no citation.
22. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981); agree; 
citation.
23. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982); agree; citation.
24. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984); agree; citation.
25. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470 
U.S. 166 (1985); CVSG; agree; citation.
26. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); CVSG;
disagree; citation.
27. Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 
735 (1988); CVSG; agree; citation.
28. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991); CVSG; agree; 
citation.
29. Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 
(1992); disagree; citation.
30. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); agree; no citation.
31. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993); agree; 
citation.
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32. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); disagree; citation.
33. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); 
agree; no citation.
34. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186 
(1996); agree; citation.
35. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); disagree; citation.
36. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 
668 (1996); O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 
518 U.S. 712 (1996); agree; no citation.
37. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); disagree; 
citation.
38. Foreman v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979 (1997); agree; 
no citation.
39. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); agree; citation.
40. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 
377 (2000); agree; no citation.
41. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); disagree; citation.
42. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); agree; no citation.
43. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); agree; no
citation.
44. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003); agree; citation.
45. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 
399 (2006); agree; no citation.
46. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 
(2008); agree; no citation.
47. Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008); disagree; citation.
48. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); agree; citation.
49. Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011); disagree; citation.
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